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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the effect of regional financial development and bank competition 
on firms’ growth using the Spanish provinces as a testing ground. Our results show that 
firms in industries with a greater dependence on external finance grow faster in more 
financially developed provinces. The results also show that bank monopoly power has 
an inverted-U effect on firms’ growth, suggesting that market power has its highest 
effect at intermediate values. The effect is heterogeneous among firms according to the 
financial dependence of the industry they belong to. This result is consistent with the 
literature on relationship banking which argues that bank competition can have a 
negative effect on the availability of finance for more informationally opaque firms.  
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1. Introduction* 
 
In recent years, we have witnessed a reawakened interest in issues related to 
economic growth, and in analyzing the importance of the sound functioning of financial 
institutions as a growth factor. Theories of financial intermediation have demonstrated 
how intermediaries help to overcome market frictions by reducing the costs of 
transferring information and wealth between savers and investors. Clearly, when 
financial systems perform their functions well, the cost of financial intermediation will 
be lower and economic growth will increase. 
 
The quality of the functions provided by the financial system can be 
approximated by aggregate measures of financial development. In this respect, “a 
growing body of work demonstrates a strong, positive link between financial 
development and economic growth, and there is even evidence that the level of financial 
development is a good predictor of future economic development” (Levine, 1993, pp. 
703). 
 
However, Rajan and Zingales (1998) suggest that the positive correlation 
normally found between financial development and economic growth may be due to a 
problem of omitted variable. Given that financial development depends on economies’ 
capacity to save and, according to certain growth models, saving affects the long-run 
growth rate of the economy, then the observation of a positive relation between 
financial development and economic growth may be a consequence of the relationship 
between these two variables and the saving rate. The precise mechanism through which 
financial development fosters economic growth must therefore be identified. 
 
With this aim, Rajan and Zingales (1998) explore the relevance of the financial 
sector to find out whether industries with a higher dependence on external finance grow 
faster in more financially developed countries. Much of the theoretical literature 
establishes that financial markets and banking institutions help to resolve problems of 
adverse selection and moral hazard, thereby reducing financing costs. In this way, 
financial development should help firms or sectors experiencing moral hazard and 
asymmetric information problems to obtain funds. Rajan and Zingales (1998) propose a 
test for this hypothesis, under the assumption that sectors with greater dependence on 
external financing will grow more rapidly when the financial markets they access are 
more developed. The advantage of this approach is that it specifies one of the 
mechanisms by which the financial sector affects growth, providing a robust causality 
test that corrects for country and economic sector effects.  
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As well as the importance of financial development, a further subject of interest 
that has received much less attention is the influence of the degree of bank competition 
on economic growth. From a theoretical (and also empirical) point of view, the 
literature on the subject shows ambiguous effects. Thus, on the one hand, the 
conventional economic theory teaches us that exercise of market power is associated 
with less credit availability, a higher interest rate and, therefore, lower economic 
growth. However, on the other hand, some authors argue that where market power 
exists, banks may have more incentive to invest in the acquisition of soft information by 
establishing close relationships with borrowers over time (relationship banking), 
facilitating the availability of credit and consequently reducing firms’ financial 
constraints (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2005). In this scenario, banks can make their 
investments in client relationships profitable in the long term as a consequence of the 
existence of an information monopoly (Petersen and Rajan, 1995).  
 
The arguments used to confirm the importance of financial development and 
bank competition on economic growth are equally valid in an application from a 
regional perspective. Thus, the existence of major differences in the degree of financial 
development and bank competition among regions in the same country can help to 
explain the differences observed in regional growth rates. 
 
As Carbó, López and Rodríguez (2006) point out, the analysis of the relationship 
between financial development (and bank competition) and growth from a regional 
perspective (rather than from a cross-country perspective) has several advantages. First, 
the use of regions within a country implies that institutional, legal, cultural, etc. factors 
are more adequately controlled, since there are fewer differences among regions than 
among countries. Second, information on regions (of a specific country) is more widely 
available and homogeneous than information on countries. And third, the relevant 
financial market (and therefore, the measurement of financial development and bank 
competition) is more accurately defined at regional level1. Thus, as Carbó et al. (2006) 
affirm, regional and provincial financial markets have been found to show significant 
differences in terms of concentration, prices and other competition indicators, which 
makes them an ideal laboratory to investigate this issue.  
  
In this context, the purpose of the present study is to provide empirical evidence 
of the effect of financial development and bank competition on economic growth in 
Spanish firms. The Spanish case provides a good testing ground to analyze these issues 
because of the significant differences among regions/provinces both in terms of 
financial development and of the competitive rivalry in the banking markets.  
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The main original contributions of this paper are as follows. First, the study 
combines information at firm level with information on the financial markets in the 
provinces. Thus, similarly to the study by Guiso et al. (2004), we extend the approach 
proposed by Rajan and Zingales using a large panel of firm-level data (in our case for 
Spanish companies). The main advantage of using firm-level data is that they allow us 
to see whether financial development and bank competition affect firms differently, 
depending on the size class they belong to. Theoretically, we do not expect all firms to 
be equally affected by provincial financial development and bank competition, 
considering that larger firms can raise funds more easily in markets at a distance from 
their main headquarters. Second, in contrast to other studies that analyze the effect of 
bank competition on economic growth or on firms’ financial constraints, the database 
we use provides information on the number of bank relationships. Thus, while previous 
studies measure the competitive rivalry of the banking market in which the borrowing 
firm has its headquarters, in this case, we can directly measure the market power of the 
banks the firm actually deals with. Third, as well as using bank market concentration as 
an indicator of competition, we use a market power indicator from the industrial 
organization literature –the Lerner index- due to the limitations of structural indicators 
based on market concentration. Furthermore, the methodological approach used allows 
us to estimate Lerner indices separately for the loan market, rather than for all banking 
activity. We can therefore measure more accurately the effect on firm growth of bank 
market power in setting loan interest rates. Fourth, in contrast to previous studies of the 
Spanish case, our bank competition indicators take into account all the banking firms 
competing in the Spanish market, incorporating not only commercial banks into the 
analysis, but also savings banks and cooperative banks. And fifth, as provincial-level 
information is available, financial variables are measured for the 52 provinces 
(NUTS3=provincias in Spain), rather than for the 17 Spanish regional administrative 
territories (Comunidades Autónomas or NUTS2). The financial development and bank 
competition indicators for the province in which each firm has its headquarters can 
therefore be more accurately attributed to individual firms. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we review the 
existing literature on the influence of financial development and bank competition on 
economic growth. Section 3 describes the model specification and the issues regarding 
the measurement of financial development, bank market power, external financial 
dependence and the specification used to analyze the effect of provincial financial 
development and bank competition on economic growth. Section 4 describes the data, 
sample and variables used. The main empirical results are provided in section 5. The 
summary of the results, conclusions and policy implications are presented in section 6.  
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2. Related literature 
 
Financial development and growth 
 
 The capacity of an economy to grow depends on its ability to raise capital 
accumulation rates, and to use the resulting productive assets more efficiently. Financial 
intermediation supports this investment process by mobilizing saving to investment. 
The efficiency of financial intermediation encourages savings and reduces constraints 
on capital accumulation. As Levine (1997) describes, the impact on economic growth of 
the functions of the financial system (to produce information ex ante about possible 
investments; to mobilize savings and allocate capital; to monitor investments; to 
facilitate the trading, diversification and management of risk; and to exchange goods 
and services) depends on three characteristics of financial systems: the level (size) of 
financial intermediation; the efficiency (quality) of financial intermediation; and the 
composition of financial intermediation. 
 
From an empirical point of view, the seminal work on the link between financial 
development and economic growth is that of Goldsmith (1969). Using data from 35 
countries for the period 1860-1963, he concludes that a parallelism exists between 
economic growth and financial development over periods of several decades. However, 
as Levine (1993) points out, Goldsmith’s work has certain limitations: a) it does not 
control for the effect of other variables relevant to explaining growth; b) the proxy 
variable used to measure the sound functioning of the financial sector has certain 
drawbacks; and c) the direction of causality is not identified.  
 
During the nineties, various studies provided empirical evidence in attempts to 
solve the problems presented by Goldsmith’s (1969) work. King and Levine (1993a and 
b) substantially extended the sample of countries, controlled for the influence of other 
variables affecting economic growth, constructed new indicators of financial 
development and analyzed their influence on a variety of economic growth dimensions. 
Their results showed a strong positive correlation between financial development and 
economic growth indicators, and revealed that initial levels of development are a good 
predictor of production, capital and productivity growth rates. 
 
Levine and Zervos (1998) investigate whether different measures of financial 
development predict future growth rates of production, capital, productivity and saving. 
Their results show a positive and significant correlation between the two groups of 
variables, even when other explanatory variables were controlled for in the estimation. 
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The results indicate that financial markets and institutions provide the services 
necessary to guarantee long term economic growth. 
  
The work of Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) evaluates whether the exogenous 
component of financial intermediation development has an influence on economic 
growth, and whether differences in the legal and accounting systems among countries 
explain the differences in their levels of financial development. Their results show that 
the exogenous component of financial intermediation development is positively 
associated with economic growth. They also find that differences in legal systems and 
accounting practices go some way to explaining the differences in financial 
development among countries. These two results indicate that legal and accounting 
reforms and the transparency and effectiveness of accounting practices can, in turn, 
foster financial development and accelerate economic growth. In the same vein, some 
authors argue that the effectiveness of financial intermediaries and markets in 
promoting economic growth depends on the institutions set up to implement financial 
transactions (see a survey in Beck and Levine, 2005). Interestingly, La Porta et al. 
(1998) find, for example, that the legal system plays a crucial role in determining 
financial development and growth relationships. 
 
Beck et al. (2000) make an important contribution, not only in their use of 
dynamic panel estimation, but also because they analyze the relationship between 
financial development and the sources of growth (productivity growth, physical capital 
accumulation, and savings). 
 
Related to the finance-growth nexus literature, recent empirical research shows 
that access to finance is an important growth constraint for firms, especially for SMEs 
(see the survey by Beck and Demirgüc-Kunt, 2006). In this context, Berger and Udell 
(2006) propose a complete conceptual framework to analyze SME credit availability 
issues in which lending technologies are the key conduit through which government 
policies and national financial structures affect credit availability.   
 
As we outlined in the introduction, the study by Rajan and Zingales (1998) 
specified the mechanism by which financial development fosters economic growth. 
Previous studies had simply verified the existence of a positive correlation between the 
two variables, without establishing the direction of causality. Although King and Levine 
(1993a) specifically explore this problem of causality and show that the predetermined 
component of financial development is a good predictor of growth over a period of 10 
to 30 years, Rajan and Zingales (1998 and 2001) put forward two arguments that 
question these results. First, the positive correlation between financial development and 
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economic growth might reflect the existence of a problem of an omitted variable, such 
as the saving rate, which is related to both variables. Second, the proxy variables for 
financial development may be leading indicators that anticipate future growth rather 
than causal factors. In an attempt to clarify these questions, Rajan and Zingales develop 
an empirical test that specifies the mechanism by which finance affects growth, thus 
providing a stronger test of causality. The mechanism they consider is that financial 
development facilitates firms’ access to external finance, particularly to those firms that 
depend most heavily on external finance, thus favoring increased investment and 
economic growth.  
 
Guiso et al. (2004) take the European case as a reference to analyze the 
importance of financial development and financial integration in explaining differences 
in economic growth using both sector and firm level data. Following the methodology 
of Rajan and Zingales (1998), their results once again confirm the positive effect of 
financial development on economic growth. Moreover, these authors use a wide range 
of simulations to analyze the effects of an advance on the degree of integration in 
European financial markets, finding a positive effect on economic growth. The greatest 
effects would take place if a similar level of financial integration were reached in 
Europe as in the United States, despite the major differences between countries. 
Countries with weaker financial structures would reap the greatest benefits, while the 
effects would be more modest in more financially developed countries. 
 
 At a regional level, many studies also analyze the importance of regional finance 
on regional economic growth2. Generally, the starting point in this literature is the 
assumption growth models usually make that financial capital is perfectly mobile 
among regions and thus does not have a key role in explaining regional growth. Amos 
and Wingender (1993) conclude from previous literature that financial capital is not 
perfectly mobile and, hence, financial activity is spatially segmented and interest rates 
are not necessarily equalized among regions. They also conclude that this does not mean 
that financial capital is perfectly immobile, as interaction exists among regional and 
national markets. They find a distinction between locally oriented credit demand from 
regional firms and households, and nationally oriented credit demand which has access 
to national financial markets.  
 
The literature classifies the effects of lifting this assumption of perfect capital 
mobility in three main categories (see Dow and Rodríguez, 1997, for a survey): regional 
monetary multipliers; interregional financial flows of funds; and regional financial 
markets. The richest stream of literature on these three categories concerns regional 
financial markets. Two sub-categories are distinguished within the regional financial 
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markets literature. The first deals with the importance of interest rate differentials3, 
while the second focuses on the regional availability of credit4 .  
 
 Given that interest rates and credit availability are two mechanisms through 
which financial markets affect economic growth, the existence of regional inequalities 
in these two variables goes some way to explaining the differences in regional growth 
rates. Furthermore, if we take into account that regional interest rates and credit 
availability differentials depend on the efficiency of financial institutions5 (see Williams 
and Gardener, 2003) and on the level of competition in regional financial markets, the 
regional financial development (proxy for the quality of functions carried out by 
financial institutions, Levine, 1997) and regional bank market power are therefore 
explanatory variables for the growth of the firms located in these regions, and 
consequently, for regional economic growth. 
 
Some papers have examined the importance of regional banking conditions for 
economic performance. Samolyk (1994) analyzes how information costs and regional 
banking conditions, especially those related to the quality of bank portfolios–the health 
of the financial market-, influence regional growth at state level in the US through 
banks’ ability to fund local projects. The underlying assumption of why financial funds 
do not flow across states is that there is a geographic dimension to the informational 
costs banks face. Amos and Wingender (1993) model the relationship between regional 
financial markets and regional income depending on which variable, either credit 
availability or interest rates, is more determinant on regional expenditure. If perfect or 
near perfect financial capital mobility existed across regions, the availability of local 
credit supply would not matter for growth, and interest rates would play a key role. But 
if capital mobility is not perfect, credit availability becomes the key variable for growth. 
Their empirical results seem to support this latter view. 
 
But even in the presence of perfect capital mobility, the analysis of the financial 
regional markets and regional growth nexus is important. Dow (1992) analyzes the 
credit creating behavior of the banking sector in Scotland, a region perfectly financially 
integrated within a national area. She finds that financial integration may adversely 
affect the allocation of new credit to a peripheral region, as freedom of capital 
movement is compatible with credit constraints. Rodriguez-Fuentes (1998) finds that 
banks influence regional economic growth, as they are not geographically neutral in the 
allocation of funds across regions. 
 
 In the Spanish case, recent studies by Carbó and Rodríguez (2004) and Carbó, 
López and Rodríguez (2006) are of particular interest. In the first case, these authors 
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employ dynamic causality and panel data techniques to find that lending dependence 
confers banks a special role in promoting regional economic growth. In the second case, 
Carbó, López and Rodríguez (2006) show that banking sector development and 
financial innovation in banking positively contribute to regional GDP, investment and 
gross savings growth. 
 
Bank competition and growth 
 
Although available empirical evidence shows a positive effect of banking sector 
size on growth, the evidence on the influence of bank competition is inconclusive. As 
Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) show, there are theoretical reasons to suggest that the 
market structure of the banking sector has a non-trivial impact on the process of capital 
accumulation and, therefore, on economic growth. Thus, on one hand, the traditional 
argument suggests that departures from perfect competition are detrimental for growth 
insofar as they are bound to generate inefficiencies in the allocation of mechanisms 
provided by the credit market. On the other hand, another argument suggests that banks 
with monopoly power have greater incentives to establish lending relationships with 
their client firms, thus facilitating their access to credit lines.  
 
As mentioned in Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2006), the effect of bank 
competition on economic growth has been analyzed directly or indirectly in two areas of 
research. In the first case, in the area of relationship lending (see a survey in Boot, 
2000), some studies have analyzed the effect of bank competition on the cost of 
financing and on credit availability, which obviously affects investment and economic 
growth. In the second case, a small number of studies have directly analyzed the effect 
of bank competition on economic growth using aggregate sector information for a 
sample of countries. 
 
One study with major repercussions for the analysis of the effect of bank 
competition in determining the value of the bank-borrowing firm relationship is that of 
Petersen and Rajan (1995). These authors develop a theoretical model that demonstrates 
how when banking markets are competitive, banks have fewer incentives to invest in 
relationship building and borrowing firms are subject to greater financial constraints. 
The model was tested empirically with data on SMEs in the USA and shows that firms 
located in less concentrated markets are subject to greater financial constraints.  
 
In the area of relationship lending, other papers have analyzed the effect of 
relationship banking on firms’ financing constraints by controlling for the influence of 
bank competition. D’Auria et al. (1999) found that an increase in concentration causes 
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an increase in the cost of financing, although the economic impact is very small. 
Angelini et al. (1998) show that concentration is not a statistically significant variable 
on financial conditions, in contrast to the evidence offered by Petersen and Rajan 
(1995).  
 
One issue that has received little attention is whether the results of the effect of 
bank market power on firm financing constraints obtained in studies of bank-firm 
relationships are robust to the use of different competition indicators. In this vein, the 
only exception is the study by Carbó, Rodríguez and Udell (2006) who analyze the 
effect of bank competition on the financial constraints facing Spanish SMEs. These 
authors were the first to use a competition indicator from the industrial organization 
(IO) literature –the Lerner index- as an alternative to traditional measures of 
concentration. Their results show that the Lerner index is a more consistent indicator of 
market power, and cast doubt on the validity of relying on concentration measures as 
proxies of competition in corporate lending relationships.  
 
Using aggregate information for a sample of countries, a few studies have 
directly analyzed the effect of bank competition on economic growth. Cetorelli and 
Gambera (2001) extend Rajan and Zingales’ (1998) model by introducing bank market 
concentration as an explanatory variable for growth. Their results provide evidence that 
bank concentration promotes growth in sectors requiring higher levels of external 
finance by facilitating credit access to firms, especially younger firms. 
 
 Given the limitations on the use of indicators of market concentration to proxy 
competition, the recent study by Claessens and Laeven (2005) analyzes the effect of 
bank competition on economic growth using an indicator of competition based on the 
theory of industrial organization. Specifically, Claessens and Laeven use the results of a 
previous study in which they calculate the H-statistic for 20 countries, though the 
analysis of its effect on economic growth is limited to 16 countries. Their main 
conclusion is that the most competitive banking systems can reduce hold-up problems 
and financial intermediation costs, favoring firms’ access to external finance. 
Furthermore, given the low degree of correlation between the H-statistic and market 
concentration, the indicators of bank market concentration do not help to forecast sector 
growth. 
 
Finally, also following the approach of Rajan and Zingales (1998), Maudos and 
Fernández de Guevara (2006) analyze the effect of financial development and bank 
competition on economic growth using both structural measures of competition and 
measures based on the new empirical industrial organization perspective. The evidence 
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obtained in the period 1993-2003 for a sample of 53 sectors in 21 countries indicates 
that financial development and the exercise of bank market power promote economic 
growth. They argue that the latter result is consistent with the literature on relationship 
lending, which affirms that bank competition can have a negative effect on the 
availability of finance for companies that are informationally more opaque. Once again, 
their results cast doubt on the use of market concentration measures as indicators of 
competition. 
 
3. Model specification and measurement issues 
 
3.1. Model specification 
 The reference model for analyzing the effect of provincial financial development 
and bank competition on firms’ growth is based on the specification adopted in Rajan 
and Zingales (1998) and subsequently expanded in Cetorelli and Gambera (2001), 
Claessens and Laeven (2005) and Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2006) to analyze 
the effect of bank competition on economic growth.  
In the initial study by Rajan and Zingales (1998), the specification focuses on 
analyzing the effect of financial development, and consequently on testing whether the 
industries most dependent on external finance present higher rates of growth in 
countries with a higher level of financial development. These authors examine the 
differential effect of a common level of financial development on different industries 
within a country. The virtues of the test are a) it looks for evidence of a specific 
mechanism by which finance affects growth, thus providing a stronger test of causality, 
and b) it corrects for fixed country and industry effects.  
 The expansion of the Rajan and Zingales model to test the effect of the degree of 
bank competition on growth takes into account the mechanism by which bank 
competition affects growth, namely through firms’ financial dependence. Thus the 
introduction of the financial dependence variable interacting with the indicator of bank 
competition allows us to verify whether firms that require higher amounts of external 
finance grow faster in provinces with more competitive banking markets (or whether 
they operate with more competitive banks), or whether, on the contrary, higher levels of 
market power facilitate access to finance for firms that would not have obtained it in 
highly competitive contexts. Thus, following the specification of Claessens and Laeven 
(2005) and Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2006), the model to be estimated is the 
following: 
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 (1) 
where i=firm, j=sector, k=the province in which the firm is located, Growth= the firm’s 
average real sales growth rate, and Bank competition is the indicator of the degree of 
bank competition in province k (Lerner index or, alternatively, an indicator of market 
concentration). The sector and province dummies capture the influence of effects 
specific to each sector or province, respectively.  
3.2. The measurement of financial development 
 
 The three main characteristics of financial systems (the level, efficiency and 
composition of financial intermediation) that condition the impact of their functions on 
economic growth are usually proxied by different indicators of financial sector 
development. Specifically, the indicators that best explain differences in economic 
growth are: size of bank credit relative to GDP, stock market activity (proxied by the 
turnover ratio or the ratio of traded value to GDP), and features of the legal system 
(such as the legal rules and corporate governance activism).  
 
Taking into account the information available for the Spanish provinces, in our 
case financial development is proxied by one of the most commonly used variables, 
namely the private credit/GDP ratio. Market capitalization of listed firms and the sum of 
private credit and market capitalization (as a percentage of GDP) are other frequently 
used variables to proxy financial development. However, because the securities market 
is national in Spain, no information is available on market capitalization of firms by 
regions. As SMEs do not have access to securities markets, we verify our results by 
splitting the sample into large and small firms. It should also be taken into account that 
the Spanish financial structure is strongly based on financial intermediaries rather than 
on markets. Hence, the absence of the market capitalization variable would have less 
impact on the results than in other countries. 
3.3. The measurement of external financial dependence 
 Following the approach in Rajan and Zingales (1998), papers that analyze the 
effect of financial development on growth measure the external financial dependence at 
industry level by using the benchmark of a country with developed capital markets in 
which firms do not face frictions in their access to financing. For the same reason, the 
external financing needs are computed for large firms, as SMEs face more financial 
restrictions. 
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As Rajan and Zingales (1998) argue, the use of a benchmark is based on the 
assumption that there are technological reasons why some industries depend on external 
finance more than others, and that these reasons are the same in all countries (in our 
case, provinces). Thus, the assumption is that if an industry in a specific province has 
certain technological characteristics, the same characteristics will be present in the rest 
of the provinces in the sample analyzed. In other words, we examine whether a firm in a 
specific industry that is more dependent on external financing grows relatively faster in 
a province that is more financially developed. 
In our case, the financial dependence for each Spanish industry is measured 
using the information for large firms. We follow the recommendation of the European 
Commission 96/280/CE to define large firms in terms of the number of employees 
(firms with more than 250 employees).  
Rajan and Zingales (1998) present a measure of external financial dependence 
on the basis of the flow of investments made by the firm that cannot be financed with 
the cash flow generated. Because the information available in our database does not 
permit financial dependence to be calculated in this way, it is proxied by means of 
balance sheet data. Specifically, the degree of external financial dependence is proxied 
as the ratio of debt with cost to current liabilities. The definition used is as follows: 
 [ ] [ : ]
[ ] [ : ] [ ]
Noncurrent liabilities Current liabilities loans
Total assets Current liabilities creditors Other current liabilities
+
− −
 (2) 
This ratio may also be expressed as Interest Bearing Debt / [Stockholders’ 
Equity + Interest Bearing Debt] and represents the debt to total capital ratio, excluding 
accounts payable and accrual liabilities from the numerator and the denominator of the 
ratio. Expression (2) avoids potential biases in the financial dependence indicator 
related to trade credit, which is a function of the firm’s operations and its contractual 
relationship with its suppliers. 
3.4. The measurement of bank competition 
 
In most studies that analyze the influence of bank competition on growth or firms’ 
financing constraints, banking industry competitiveness is proxied by a market 
concentration index. However, recent studies (Berger et al., 2004; Maudos and 
Fernández de Guevara, 2004, 2006 and 2007; Fernández de Guevara et al., 2005; 
Fernández de Guevara and Maudos, 2007; Claessens and Laeven, 2004; Carbó, 
Rodriguez and Udell, 2006, among others) have demonstrated the limitations of 
proxying bank competition intensity with concentration measures, and suggest the need 
 14
to use alternative indicators. For this reason, we use a competition indicator from the 
new empirical industrial organization approach: the Lerner index.  
 
The Lerner index measures the capacity to set interest rates above marginal costs as 
a proportion of prices. This market power indicator is usually derived from the Monti-
Klein model, in which under standard assumptions (see Freixas and Rochet, 1997; and 
Maudos and Fernández de Guevara, 2007), the first order condition of a profit 
maximization problem yields the following expression for the loan market: 
  
 
*
* *
1
( )ε
⎡ ⎤− −⎣ ⎦
=
L L
L L L
r r mc
r N r
 (3) 
where rL and r are the interest rates of loans (L) and interbank market, respectively, mcL 
is the marginal operating costs, εL is the elasticity of demand for loans, N is the number 
of competitors in the market, and the expression of the Lerner index appears on the left 
hand side of the equation  
The estimation of the Lerner index has been applied in studies by Angelini and 
Cetorelli (2003), Fernández de Guevara et al. (2005 and 2007), Maudos and Fernández 
de Guevara (2004, 2006 and 2007), Fernández de Guevara and Maudos (2007), Carbó, 
Humphrey and Rodríguez (2003), Carbó, Rodríguez and Udell (2006), among others. 
However, only in Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2006 and 2007) is the Lerner 
index estimated separately for loans (and deposits) 6. 
 
Marginal operating costs are estimated from a translog cost function, where 
operating costs depend on two outputs (loans, and deposits), two input prices (price of 
labor and price of physical capital) and technical change proxied by a time trend7. 
  
In order to test the robustness of results, we also use bank market concentration 
as an indicator of competition. Specifically, we use the Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
(HHI), which is defined as the sum of the square of the market shares of all the banks 
competing in the market. As in other studies referring to the Spanish economy (Carbó, 
Humphrey and Rodríguez, 2003; Fernández de Guevara and Maudos, 2007; among 
others), we consider that the regional market (specifically the province) is the most 
relevant for evaluating competition, given that many financial institutions are in fact 
present in just one or a few provinces. Since the only information available for each 
bank at provincial level is the distribution of its branch network, we use this variable as 
proxy for banking output to calculate the market concentration in each province. 
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4. Data, sample and variables used 
To estimate equation (1), we must combine information on the firm’s growth 
and the financial development and bank competition in the province where the firm has 
its main headquarters. In the first case, as in Guiso et al. (2004), economic growth is 
proxied by the annual sales growth rate8 on the basis of the SABI (Sistema de Análisis 
de Balances Ibéricos) database provided by Bureau Van Dijk, which contains financial 
and economic information for a large sample of Spanish firms. Due to the scarcity of 
information from 2004 onwards, the period considered runs from 1997 to 2003. 
However, considering that data is only available over shorter time intervals for many 
firms, we compute the average annual growth rate for each firm using the available 
sample for the firm. The growth variable is merged with province level data on 
indicators of financial development and bank competition and sector level data on 
financial dependence. Real sales growth rates are computed using the value added 
deflators for the same sectors of activity (2-digits activity classification from the 
European industrial activity classification-NACE rev. 1) obtained from Spanish 
National Accounts. 
The information on financial development is proxied by one of the most 
commonly used variables, namely the private credit/GDP ratio. The information is taken 
from the Bank of Spain (private credit) and from the National Institute of Statistics 
(GDP).  
Financial dependence is also proxied using information from the SABI database. 
SABI offers information on the sector of activity to which each firm belongs according 
to different sector classifications. Specifically, the SABI data used were obtained 
according to the NACE Rev. 1 classification (59 industries). As in other papers, we 
restrict our attention to manufacturing firms in order to reduce dependence on region-
specific factors. However, as in Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2006), we also 
include the private service sectors of the economy due to their important contribution to 
the GDP (53% of the Spanish GDP in 2003). We excluded the financial sector from the 
services sector. With these criteria, we selected firms from 38 industries.   
 From data on the large firms, the financial dependence is calculated for each 
sector, aggregating the firms’ data for each year in the numerator and in the 
denominator of expression (2). Subsequently we obtain the average of the annual data 
during the period 1997-2003, so that the degree of financial dependence refers to the 
average for the period. As suggested by Rajan and Zingales (1998), using the average of 
the data smoothes temporal fluctuations and reduces the effects of outliers. Altogether, 
for the large firms, information is available for 1,204 firms.  
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In the case of the Lerner index, the statistical sources used are the balance sheets 
and profit and loss accounts of the commercial banks, savings banks and cooperative 
banks published by the AEB (Asociación Española de Banca), CECA (Confederación 
Española de Cajas de Ahorros) and UNACC (Unión Nacional de Cooperativas de 
Crédito)9, respectively. The sample includes practically all the financial institutions 
operating in Spain during the period 1997-2003 (the sample used represents more than 
90% of the total bank assets in Spain, being eliminated only those banks with 
incomplete information or those considered outliers).   
The loan interest rate (rL) is computed as the ratio of interest income divided by 
loans. The money market rate is proxied by the annual inter-bank deposit rate. Marginal 
operating costs are calculated by estimating equation the above mentioned cost function 
As panel data are available, fixed effects are introduced in the estimation of the costs 
function to capture the effect of possible unobserved variables specific to each bank 
To calculate the indices of market concentration we use the provincial 
distribution of the bank branch network, as this is the only regional information 
available at bank level (regional branch distribution in each province.) This information 
is also supplied by AEB, CECA and UNACC. 
The database used to calculate the sales growth rate for each firm (SABI)  lists 
the banks each firm has a relationships with. Consequently, in contrast to other studies 
that analyze the effect of bank competition on economic growth or on firms’ financial 
constraints, we can measure the market power of the banks with which each borrower 
has a relationship. In this way, apart from analyzing the effect of the degree of 
competition in the provincial banking market where the firm has its headquarters, we 
can also analyze the effect of the market power of the banks each borrower does 
business with10.  
We eliminated the firms in the SABI database for which information on the 
banks they do business with is not available. We also eliminated firms with assets below 
500,000 euros (micro firms), due to the inferior quality of their accounting information 
(see Dechow and Dichev, 2002). In fact, micro firms’ annual accounts are only audited 
in exceptional circumstances, and many of them are simply shell companies, with no 
trading activity, whose key operations are not typical of a firm providing goods or 
services. Firms with no information available to calculate any one of the variables 
required for the estimation were also eliminated. Following these criteria, the final 
sample totaled 11,142 observations (see table 1)11. 
>Insert here table 1< 
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5. Empirical results 
Table 2 shows the degree of external financial dependence for the different 
sectors of activity. The sectors presenting the highest level of external financial 
dependence are “Real estate activities” (0.67), “Renting of machinery and equipment” 
(0.66), “Air transport” (0.65) and “Land transport” (0.65). The lowest level of financial 
dependence corresponds to the “Recycling” (0.07), and “Manufacture of motor 
vehicles” (0.19) sectors. 
>Insert here table 2< 
In equation (1), external financial dependence interacts with financial variables 
to estimate the impact it has on firms’ growth. Figure 1 shows the value of the financial 
development indicator for the Spanish provinces. Specifically, the map classifies the 
provinces in quartiles according to their level of financial development. Significant 
differences can clearly be seen among provinces: while the mean value of financial 
development is 0.71, the minimum value is 0.44 and the maximum is 1.22 
(corresponding to Madrid).  
>Insert here figure 1< 
 With regard to the bank competition indicators, figure 2 shows the provincial 
distribution of the Lerner index in the loan market. The value for each province is 
computed as a weighted average of the Lerner indices of the bank institutions with 
branches in that province, weighting with the number of branches of each bank12. 
Inequalities among provinces are also confirmed, although they are lower than those 
found for financial development. Thus, the coefficient of variation is 0.08 in terms of 
the Lerner index across provinces and 0.20 in terms of financial development. The 
Lerner index average is 0.33 and the maximum and minimum are 0.39 and 0.28, 
respectively13. 
>Insert here figure 2< 
 Provincial differences are sharper in terms of bank market concentration (figure 
3). Thus, while the average HHI value is 1,390, the variation interval ranges from a 
minimum value of 790 and a maximum of 2,406. If we take as our reference the HHI 
value that USA regulators use to approve or reject a merger (the 1,800/200 rule14), nine 
Spanish provinces have HHIs over 1,800, thus revealing a very high bank market 
concentration. 
>Insert here figure 3< 
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 The estimation of the effect of financial development and bank competition on 
firms’ growth is based on equation (1). Initially, we present the results referring to the 
effect of financial development on economic growth, without including the proxies for 
bank competition. At the end of each column we provide the estimation of the economic 
impact associated with financial development and bank competition. Specifically, the 
last rows of the tables show the differential in real sales growth between a firm 
belonging to an industry at the 75th percentile level of external dependence and a firm 
belonging to an industry at the 25th percentile level when the firm is located in a 
province at the 75th percentile of financial development (bank competition) rather than 
in one at the 25th percentile (with less financial development and a higher level of 
competition). Table 3 contains the statistics of the variables used.  
>Insert here table 3< 
 Column 1 of table 4 shows the results from Rajan and Zingales’ basic 
specification15. The coefficient of the interaction term between financial development 
and financial dependence is positive and statistically different from zero at the 1% level, 
indicating that financial development affects growth, particularly in those sectors that 
rely more heavily on external finance. The differential in real sales growth between a 
situation of low regional financial development and one of higher development 
corresponds to approximately 0.55 percentage points of growth in the more financially 
dependent sectors. This result coincides with prior studies that find evidence to support 
the hypothesis that financial development facilitates economic growth. 
>Insert here table 4< 
 The second column shows the results when the effect of bank competition, 
measured by bank market concentration (HHI), is introduced into the regression. The 
effect of financial development remains and the coefficient of the interaction term 
between financial dependence and the HHI is positive but not statistically different from 
zero.  
 To check for non-linearity, the third column adds a squared term of the 
interaction term between financial dependence and bank market concentration. 
Although the sign of the squared term is positive, it is not statistically different from 
zero.  
 If, instead of using the HHI as a proxy for bank competition, we introduce into 
the regression the Lerner index of the province where the firm has its headquarters 
(column 4), the effect is negative and statistically significant, implying that greater 
market power generates lower growth. However, if we check for non-linearity (column 
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5), the effect of bank market power on growth is not statistically significant (neither the 
interaction term nor the squared term is statistically different from zero). 
 As mentioned above, the SABI database reports the name of the banks with 
which each borrower has a relationship. This information enables us to compute the 
mean Lerner index for these banks16. Column (6) of table 4 shows that when the 
interaction term between financial dependence and the Lerner index is introduced into 
the estimation, the coefficient is not statistically different from zero. However, if the 
square of the interaction term is included (column 7), we find that bank market power 
has an inverted-U effect, as the level of the interaction term is positive (and statistically 
significant) and the squared term is negative (and statistically different from zero). This 
result coincides with Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) and suggests that the overall growth 
potential of the firms’ sales is highest at intermediate values of market power, since 
sectors in an intermediate interval of the distribution of external dependence benefit 
substantially. This is due to the fact that with moderate levels of market power, banking 
firms capitalize on the advantages derived from investing in lasting relationships with 
their clients, and can thereby overcome the typical problems of asymmetric information 
and moral hazard associated with the task of financial intermediation. Therefore, while 
firms still have to bear higher financing costs, they are faced with fewer restrictions to 
financing. This greater finance availability is what subsequently leads to higher sales 
growth. However, once a certain threshold has been crossed, increases in market power 
are detrimental to firms, as the higher financial costs they face outweigh the advantages 
associated with greater credit availability17.  
The magnitude of the total differential effect of bank market power (proxied by 
the Lerner index of banks that borrowers deal with) on sales growth is positive (0.343 
pp.) and statistically different from zero, as the squared term is larger than the level 
term. Taking into account the non-linear relationship, the maximum effect on growth of 
the interaction between external financial dependence and bank market power occurs 
when the value of the interaction term is 0.16 (see figure 4). This value is close to the 
sample mean (and median) of 0.16 (see table 3), which implies that for a large number 
of firms (for 50% of the probability mass of the variable) the value of the interaction 
term falls within the range in which any increase in the interaction term will involve 
reductions in their sales growth rate. If we isolate the effect of bank competition, the 
value of the Lerner index that maximizes the sales growth rate (evaluated as the mean 
value of financial dependence) is 0.38, against a mean sample value of 0.39. As a 
consequence, once again, firms that maintain relationships with banks whose Lerner 
index is over 0.38 will grow, ceteris paribus, at a slower rate than firms dealing with 
banks whose Lerner index value is below 0.38. If we bear in mind that the value of the 
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Lerner index increased in the period analyzed (see Fernández de Guevara and Maudos, 
2007), this increase in market power will have prejudiced the growth of a large number 
of Spanish firms. Obviously, the negative effect of maintaining relationships with banks 
with high levels of market power will be greater for firms with high levels of financial 
dependence. Thus, according to figure 4, the annual sales growth may be negative for 
high financial dependence borrowers dealing with banks with high levels of market 
power. 
>Insert here figure 4< 
 Some papers (for example, Petersen and Rajan, 1995) argue that the incentives 
for monopolistic banks to establish lending relationships with small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) are greater, because these firms concentrate their external borrowing 
from banks and because the problems of asymmetric information between the bank and 
the borrower are higher. For this reason, we split the sample by size and estimate two 
separate regressions, for firms with more than and fewer than 250 employees, 
respectively 18.  
 Table 5 shows the results for SMEs. Compared with the results for the whole 
sample (table 4), all the signs and significance of the estimates remain the same, 
although the financial development and bank competition indicators have a greater 
impact. In contrast to SMEs, the effect of financial development and bank competition 
on sales growth in large firms (table 6) is not statistically significant19. These results 
support the hypothesis that financial development constrains SME growth more 
severely and, therefore, an improvement in financial development should be expected to 
have a greater impact in provinces where SMEs have a higher presence. This evidence 
coincides with the findings of Guiso et al. (2004) from extensive international firm-
level panel data for European Union and transition economy firms. These authors argue 
that larger firms can raise funds more easily in markets at a distance from their main 
headquarters20.  
>Insert here table 5< 
>Insert here table 6< 
The greater impact of bank competition on sales growth in SMEs as compared to 
large firms may be due to the fact that, as well as being more dependent on bank 
financing, banks have more incentives to invest in relationship building with SMEs 
because they are more informationally opaque than large firms. Thus, SMEs are more 
likely to receive finance in non-competitive loan markets, although above a certain 
threshold, increases in market power cause slower sales growth.  
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6. Summary, conclusions and policy implications 
This paper analyses the effect of financial development and bank competition on 
firms’ growth from a regional perspective. We take the Spanish case as a testing ground, 
and combine firm-level information with information on the financial markets in the 
provinces. The main innovations, given that the database used contains information on 
the banks each borrower has a relationship with, are that we are able to analyze the 
effect of provincial bank competition on growth, as well as the effect of the market 
power of the banks the borrower firm actually deals with. Moreover, as well as 
following the usual practice of taking bank market concentration as a competition 
indicator, we use a second competition indicator from the industrial organization 
literature: the Lerner index. Furthermore, the methodological approach used allows us 
to estimate Lerner indices separately for the loan market, rather than for all banking 
activity. Finally, given the availability of provincial-level information, financial 
variables are measured for the 52 provinces (NUTS3), rather than for the 17 regional 
administrative territories (Comunidades Autónomas or NUTS2).  
 
Using a model that specifies the mechanism through which finance influences 
growth, our results show the positive effect of provincial financial development on the 
economic growth of firms that are more dependent on external finance. We estimate that 
the impact of provincial financial development on the growth of Spanish firms is around 
0.6percentage points as a consequence, primarily, of the effect of financial development 
on the sales growth of small and medium firms (SMEs). This is because large firms 
have more ready access to finance from other financial institutions or markets from 
other regions (or even from other countries). 
 
Although we do not find a statistically significant effect of the average 
provincial banking market competition on firms’ sales growth, bank competition does 
matter for growth. What is relevant for firms’ sales growth is not the level of provincial 
bank competition, but the level of market power held by the banks the firm borrows 
from. More precisely, results also show that bank monopoly power has an inverted-U 
effect on firms’ growth, suggesting that the positive effect of market power on growth is 
highest at intermediate values. The effect is heterogeneous among firms in line with the 
financial dependence of the industry they belong to: firms from sectors that depend 
more heavily on external finance enjoy a beneficial effect from (moderate) bank market 
power. This result is consistent with the literature on relationship banking which argues 
that bank competition can have a negative effect on the availability of finance for more 
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informationally opaque firms by reducing the expected benefits of investments in 
obtaining specific information from clients. Furthermore, the effect of bank competition 
(and financial development) on firms’ growth is more important for SMEs because they 
are more dependent on bank financing and because the problems that arise from 
asymmetric information on borrower quality are also more relevant in SMEs than in 
large firms. 
 
Overall, our results show that in the banking sector, neither perfect competition 
nor monopoly is the optimal banking market structure from the point of view of 
economic growth, but rather a situation of intermediate monopolistic competition is the 
most advantageous. Furthermore, according to conventional wisdom there is a trade-off 
between financial stability and competition in banking: some market power must 
therefore be permitted in order to guarantee financial sector stability and, consequently, 
to promote economic growth.  
The results obtained on the effect of financial development and bank 
competition on firms’ growth may reflect, in part, the influence these two variables have 
on firms’ financing constraints. The variable used to proxy economic growth (sales 
growth) is also used in other papers (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997, Lamont et al, 2001 and 
Carbó et al. 2006, among others) as an indirect measure of financing constraints (and 
also as an indirect measure of investment opportunities and cash-flows). From this 
alternative interpretation of sales growth, our results would suggest that financial 
development and intermediate levels of bank market power reduce firms’ financing 
constraints. 
 
A policy implication arising from our results, in accordance with other papers at 
a national level, is the need to promote greater regional financial development. Our 
results seem to indicate that the exercise of a certain amount of bank market power, 
given the negative effect on economic growth of excessive competitive rivalry in 
banking markets, could be beneficial under certain circumstances. However, there is a 
threshold above which any increases in market power can be detrimental to growth, and 
for this reason public authorities should ensure that the banking sector does not go 
beyond this maximum tolerance level.  
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1 For small and medium sized banks that are only present in local markets, the relevant market is regional, 
not national as papers that focus on country comparisons very often tend to assume. 
2 See a survey in Dow and Rodríguez (1997) and also Williams and Gardener (2003) and Dow (1988), 
among others. 
3 See, among the more recent publications, Hutchinson and McKillop (1990) and Faini et al. (1993). 
4 See, among others, Amos and Wingender (1993), Samolyk (1994), Rodriguez (1998) and Mackay and 
Molyneux (1996).  
5 As Dow and Rodriguez (1997) point out, factors related to market structure (concentration ratios, 
number of competitors, etc.) have been analyzed as explanatory variables of regional interest rate 
differentials. 
6 The other papers estimate a Lerner index for all banking activity as the ratio (price of total assets-
marginal costs of total assets)/price.   
7 For the specification of the cost function and the expression of the marginal costs, see Maudos and 
Fernández de Guevara (2007). Symmetry and linear homogeneity in input prices restrictions are imposed. 
8  Papers that analyze the effect of financial development on growth with disaggregated information at 
industry level use different measures of economic growth: output, value added, sales, number of firms 
and firm size. However, at firm level, it is preferable to use sales growth rather than other indicators of 
firms’ growth such as value added. As Guiso et al. (2004) state, value added statistics from balance sheet 
information suffer from differences in accounting practices and methodologies across firms (countries 
and sectors), resulting in large measurement errors. Differences in methodologies are less of an issue with 
sales, which is the least ambiguous accounting concept. Indeed, in our particular case, SABI reports 
information on sales for a large number of firms 
9 As far as we know, this is the only paper that includes credit cooperatives in the analysis of competition 
for the Spanish banking sector. Although the aggregate for the Spanish credit cooperative banking sector 
accounts for only about 5% of the total market assets, it should be remembered that these entities play an 
important role in some provinces. 
10 As one of the referees suggests, both measures give different information and both are important. Thus, 
it is important to know the effect of the overall competition in the market (at provincial level) and also the 
effect of the market power of the banks with which each borrower has a relationship.  
11 We have verified the representativeness (by provinces) of the sample used. To this end, we compared 
the provincial distribution of the sample used (in terms of number of firms) with the provincial 
distribution of the “Central Directory of Firms” (Directorio central de empresas, DIRCE) from the 
National Institute of Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, INE), which includes the universe of 
companies operating in Spain. The Pearson correlation coefficient between the two provincial 
distributions is 0.98. Therefore, the sample is representative by provinces.   
12 As mentioned above, the only information available for each bank at provincial level is the distribution 
of its branch network. 
13 The differences in the Lerner index are much more pronounced at bank level. Thus, banks with high 
indices (close to one) coexist with others whose indexes are close to zero. 
14 See, Cetorelli, 1999. 
15 The explanatory power of the estimated model is very small (according to the R2). This result is due to 
the presence of a large firm-specific noise that is absent in the studies that use industry data as a result of 
aggregation. For example, Guiso et al. (2004) also report R2 around 0.02 using a large international panel 
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of firm-level data for companies in EU and transition countries (32,269 observations). However, their R2 
are higher (around 0.36) using industry data. 
16 The values of the Lerner indices are in concordance with values estimated in other papers (around 0.24 
in Carbó, López del Paso and Rodriguez, 2003 for the period 1986-99; and 0.23 in Maudos and Pérez for 
the period 1992-01). Carbó, Fernández de Guevara, Humphrey and Maudos (2005) report similar values 
of the Lerner index in the loan market. 
17 A further reason why a certain level of bank market power may favor economic growth is due to a 
possible trade-off between bank competition and financial stability, although the theoretical literature is 
not unanimous on this issue (see Allen and Gale, 2004). 
18 Results are robust if the sample is split into firms with over 50 employees and those with fewer than 50. 
19 As the effect of financial development and bank competition on sales growth is not statistically 
significant, table 6 does not report the differential in the real sales growth rate.  
20 We must take into account that our financial development indicator is based only on bank credit. Larger 
firms usually have access to other sources of financing through the market. 
25 
References 
Allen, F., Gale, D. (2004). Competition and Financial Stability. Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking 36, 433-480. 
 
Amos, O.M. and Wingender, J.R. (1993). A model of the interaction between regional 
financial markets and regional growth, Regional Science and Urban Economics, 23(1): 
85-110. 
 
Angelini, P., Disalvo, R., Ferri, G. (1998). Availability and cost of credit for small 
businesses: customer relationships and credit cooperatives. Journal of Banking and 
Finance 22, 925-54. 
 
Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., Lozaya, N. (2000). Finance and sources of growth. 
Journal of Financial Economics 58, 261-300.  
Beck, T., Levine, R., Loayza, N. (2000). Finance and the sources of growth. Journal of 
Financial Economics 58, 261-300. 
 
Beck, T., Levine, R. (2005). Legal institutions and financial development. In Handbook 
of New Institutional Economics, 251-278. 
 
Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A. (2006). Small and medium-size enterprises: Access to 
finance as a growth constraint. Journal of Banking and Finance 30, 2931-2943. 
Berger, A., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., Levine, R., Haubrich, J. (2004). Bank concentration 
and competition: an evolution in the making. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 
355, 433-451. 
Berger, A., Udell, G. (2006). A more complete conceptual framework for SME finance. 
Journal of Banking and Finance 30, 2945-2966. 
Boot, W. (2000). Relationship banking: what do we know? Journal of Financial 
Intermediation  9, 7-25. 
Carbó, S., López del Paso, R., Rodríguez, F. (2003). Medición de la competencia en 
mercados bancarios regionales. Revista de Economia Aplicada XI(32), 5-50. 
Carbó, S., Humphrey, D. and Rodríguez, F. (2003). Deregulation, Bank Competition 
and Regional Growth. Regional Studies 37, 227-237. 
 26
Carbó, S. and Rodriguez, F. (2004). The finance-growth nexus, a regional perspective. 
European Urban and Regional Studies 11, 339-354. 
Carbó, S., Fernández de Guevara, J., Humphrey, D., Maudos, J. (2005). Estimating the 
intensity of price and non-price in banking: an application to the Spanish case, Working 
Paper BBVA Foundation , DT 05-02. 
 
Carbó, S., López del Paso, R., and Rodríguez, F. (2006). Financial innovations in 
banking: impact on regional growth. Regional Studies, forthcoming. 
Carbó, S., Rodriguez, F., Udell, G. (2006). Bank Market Power and SME Financing 
Constraints. Proceedings of The 42nd Annual Conference on Bank Structure & 
Competition, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 17-19 May, Chicago. 
Cetorelli, N. (1999). Competitive analysis in banking: appraisal of the methodologies. 
Federal Reserve of Chicago, Economic Perspectives, Issue Q1, 2-15. 
Cetorelli, N., Gambera, M. (2001). Banking market structure, financial dependence and 
growth: international evidence from industry data. Journal of Finance 56, 617-648.  
Claessens, S., Laeven, L. (2004). What drives bank competition? Some international 
evidence. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 36(3), 563-583. 
Claessens, S., Laeven, L. (2005). Financial dependence, banking sector competition, 
and economic growth. Journal of the European Economic Association 3 (1), 179-207. 
D’Auria, C., Foglia, A., Reedtz, P. (1999). Bank interest rates and credit relationships in 
Italy. Journal of Banking and Finance 237, 1067-93. 
Dechow, P.M., and Dichev, I.D. (2002). The quality of accruals and earnings: The role 
of accruals estimation errors. The Accounting Review 77, 35-59. 
Dell´Ariccia, G., Marquez, R. (2004). Information and bank credit allocation. Journal of 
Financial Economics 72(1), 185-214. 
Dow, S.C. (1988). Incorporating money in regional economic models. In f. Harrigan 
and P. McGregor (eds.). Recent advances in regional economic modelling. London 
Papers in Regional Science, 19, London: Pion Press.  
Dow, S.C. (1992). The regional financial sectors: a Scottish case study. Regional 
Studies, 26(7), 619-631. 
 27
Dow, S.C., Rodriguez-Fuentes, C.J. (1997). Regional finance: a survey. Regional 
Studies 31, 903-920. 
Faini, R., Galli, G. and Giannini, C. (1993). Finance and development: the case of 
Southern Italy’, in A. Giovannini (ed.) Finance and development: issues and experience, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Fernández de Guevara, J., Maudos, J. (2004). Measuring welfare loss of market power: 
an application to European banks. Applied Economics Letters 1113), 833-836. 
Fernández de Guevara, J., Maudos, J., Pérez, F. (2005). Market power in European 
banking. Journal of Financial Services Research 27(2), 109-137. 
Fernández de Guevara, J., Maudos, J., Pérez, F. (2007). Integration and competition in 
the European financial markets. Journal of International Money and Finance 26, 26-45. 
Fernández de Guevara, and J., Maudos, J. (2007). Explanatory factors of market power 
in the banking system. Manchester School, forthcoming. 
Freixas, X. and Rochet, J.C. (1997). Microeconomics of banking. MIT Press.  
Goldsmith, R. (1969). Financial structure and development. New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press.  
Guiso, L., Jappelli,T.,  Padula, M., Pagano, M. (2004). Financial market integration and 
economic growth in the UE. Economic Policy, October, 523-577. 
Hutchinson, R.W., McKillop, D.G. (1990). Regional financial sector models: an 
application to the Northern Ireland financial sector, Regional Studies 24, 421-31. 
Kaplan, S., Zingales, L. (1997). Do financing constraints explain why investment is  
correlated with cash flow? Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 169-215. 
 
King, R., Levine, R. (1993a). Finance and growth: Schumperter might be right. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, 717-737. 
King, R., Levine, R. (1993b). Finance, Entrepreneurship and Growth: Theory and 
Experience. Journal of Monetary Economics 32, 513-542. 
Lamont, O., Polk, C, Saá-Requejo, J. (2001). Financial constraints and stock returns”, 
Review of Financial Studies 14, 529-54. 
 28
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W. (1998). Law and finance. 
Journal of Political Economy 106, 1113-1155. 
Levine, R. (1993). Financial development and economic growth: views and agenda. 
Journal of Economic Literature XXXV, 668-726. 
Levine, R. (1997). Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda. 
Journal of Economic Literature 35, 688-726. 
Levine, R., Zervos, S. (1998). Stock markets, banks, and economic growth. American 
Economic Review 88, 537-558. 
Levine, R, Loayza, N., Beck, T. (2000). Financial Intermediation and Growth: Causality 
and Causes. Journal of Monetary. Economics 46, 31-77. 
Mackay, R., Molyneux, P. (1996). Bank credit and regions: a comparison within 
Europe. Regional Studies 30, 757-763. 
Maudos, J., Pérez, F. (2003). Competencia vs. poder de mercado en la banca española. 
Moneda y Crédito 217, 139-166. 
Maudos, J., Fernández de Guevara, J. (2004). Factors explaining the interest margin in 
the banking sectors of the European Union. Journal of Banking and Finance 28/9, 2259-
2281. 
Maudos, J., Fernández de Guevara, J. (2006). Financial development, bank competition 
and economic growth.Working Paper No. 269, Spanish Savings Banks Foundation, 
FUNCAS. 
Maudos, J., Fernández de Guevara, J. (2007). The cost of market power in banking: 
social welfare loss vs. cost inefficiency. Journal of Banking and Finance, forthcoming. 
Petersen, M., Rajan R. (1995). The effect of credit market competition on lending 
relationships. Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, 407-443. 
Rajan, R., Zingales, L. (1998). Financial dependence and growth. American Economic 
Review 88, 559-587. 
Rajan, R., Zingales, L. (2001). Financial systems, industrial structure, and growth. 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy 17(4), 467-482. 
Rodríguez-Fuentes, C.J. (1998). Credit availability and regional development, Papers in 
Regional Science, 77(1): 63-75. 
 29
Samolyk, K.A. (1994). Banking Conditions and Regional Economic Performance. 
Evidence of a Regional Credit Channel, Journal of Monetary Economics, 34: 259-78. 
Williams, J., Gardener, E.P.M. (2003). The efficiency of European regional banking. 
Regional Studies 37, 321-330. 
 30
Table 1. Number of observations in sample
NACE Rev. 
1 Industry
Number of 
observations
15 Manufacture of food products and beverages 880
16 Manufacture of tobacco products 5
17 Manufacture of textiles 232
18 Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur 
85
19 Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, 
handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear 66
20 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except 
furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials 
119
21 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products 167
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 265
24 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 404
25 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 287
26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 406
27 Manufacture of basic metals 182
28 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and 
equipment 447
29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 323
30 Manufacture of office machinery and computers 7
31 Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 162
32 Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment 
and apparatus 53
33 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, 
watches and clocks 34
34 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 165
35 Manufacture of other transport equipment 65
36 Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 187
37 Recycling 15
45 Construction 1,074
50 Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; 
retail sale of automotive fuel 651
51 Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles 
and motorcycles 2,674
52 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of 
personal and household goods 354
55 Hotels and restaurants 333
60 Land transport; transport via pipelines 167
61 Water transport 25
62 Air transport 12
63 Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities of travel 
agencies 180
64 Post and telecommunications 26
70 Real estate activities 523
71 Renting of machinery and equipment without operator and of 
personal and household goods 63
72 Computer and related activities 78
73 Research and development 11
74 Other business activities 415
Source: SABI.
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Table 2. Financial dependence by industry. Average 1997-2003. Large firms
NACE 
Rev 1 Industry
Financial 
dependence
15 Manufacture of food products and beverages 0.391
16 Manufacture of tobacco products 0.303
17 Manufacture of textiles 0.286
18 Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur 0.342
19 Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddlery, 
harness and footwear 
0.395
20 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; 
manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials 
0.348
21 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products 0.247
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 0.394
24 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 0.340
25 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 0.392
26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 0.378
27 Manufacture of basic metals 0.273
28 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 0.412
29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 0.350
30 Manufacture of office machinery and computers 0.458
31 Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 0.352
32 Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus 0.407
33 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 0.207
34 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 0.195
35 Manufacture of other transport equipment 0.469
36 Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 0.363
37 Recycling 0.071
45 Construction 0.477
50 Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale of 
automotive fuel 
0.325
51 Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 0.383
52 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of personal and 
household goods 
0.295
55 Hotels and restaurants 0.478
60 Land transport; transport via pipelines 0.648
61 Water transport 0.511
62 Air transport 0.654
63 Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities of travel agencies 0.352
64 Post and telecommunications 0.588
70 Real estate activities 0.674
71 Renting of machinery and equipment without operator and of personal and 
household goods 
0.656
72 Computer and related activities 0.305
73 Research and development 0.538
74 Other business activities 0.556
Source: SABI and own elaboration
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the variables used
 Mean Median Max. Min. 25th percentil
75th 
percentil Std. Dev.
Real growth rate of sales 0.027 0.032 8.647 -5.215 -0.041 0.112 0.322
Financial dependence*Financial development 0.358 0.324 0.825 0.046 0.272 0.399 0.128
Financial dependence*HHI 0.045 0.041 0.147 0.006 0.035 0.052 0.015
Financial dependence*HHI2 0.002 0.002 0.022 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.002
Financial dependence*Lerner index of the market 0.137 0.134 0.261 0.021 0.118 0.146 0.035
Financial dependence*Lerner index of the market2 0.020 0.018 0.068 0.000 0.014 0.021 0.011
Financial dependence*Lerner index of banks each firm does 
business with
0.158 0.150 0.374 -0.123 0.129 0.179 0.047
Financial dependence*Lerner index of banks each firm does 
business with
0.027 0.023 0.140 0.000 0.017 0.032 0.018
Source: SABI, INE, AEB, CECA, UNACC and own elaboration
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Table 4. Financial development, bank competition and growth rate of sales. Total firms
     
(1)
Constant -0.313 *** -0.321 * 0.005 0.162 -1.323 -0.287 *** -0.360 ***
(0.08) (0.19) (0.41) (0.30) (1.12) (0.08) (0.09)
Financial dependence*Financial development 0.411 *** 0.416 ** 0.389 ** 0.498 *** 0.497 *** 0.409 *** 0.426 ***
(0.15) (0.18) (0.18) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15)
Financial dependence*HHI 0.071 -5.336
(1.53) (6.16)
Financial dependence*HHI2 22.242
(24.56)
Financial dependence*Lerner index of the market -2.553 * 8.369
(1.54) (8.05)
Financial dependence*Lerner index of the market2 -17.948
(12.99)
Financial dependence*Lerner index of banks each firm does 
business with
-0.110 0.709 **
(0.11) (0.36)
Financial dependence*Lerner index of  banks each firm does 
business with
-2.310 **
(0.96)
R2 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.015
Number of observations 11,142 11,142 11,142 11,142 11,142 11,142 11,142
Differential in real growth rate 
Financial development 0.550 *** 0.556 ** 0.520 ** 0.666 0.664 *** 0.547 *** 0.571 ***
Bank competition - 0.012 -0.910 -0.468 * 1.527 -0.054 0.343 **
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
 
Note: The dependent variable is the annual growth rate of sales for the period 1997-03. The differential in real growth rate measures (in percentage terms) how much faster a 
firm belonging to a sector at the 75th percentile level of financial dependence grows with respect to a sector at the 25th percentile level when it is located in a province at the 
75th percentile of financial development (bank competition) rather than in one at the 25th percentile. All regressions include both province and sector-fixed effects (not 
reported). * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 5. Financial development, bank competition and growth rate of sales. SMEs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Constant -0.404 *** -0.436 ** 0.154 0.144 -1.723 -0.366 *** -0.451 ***
(0.09) (0.21) (0.44) (0.32) (1.25) (0.09) (0.10)
Financial dependence*Financial development 0.513 *** 0.531 *** 0.484 ** 0.615 *** 0.615 *** 0.511 *** 0.533 ***
(0.17) (0.20) (0.20) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17)
Financial dependence*HHI 0.276 -9.493
(1.65) (6.74)
Financial dependence*HHI2 39.774
(26.59)
Financial dependence*Lerner index of the market -2.953 ** 10.716
(1.68) (9.00)
Financial dependence*Lerner index of the market2 -22.265
(14.41)
Financial dependence*Lerner index of banks each firm does 
business with
-0.167 0.790 **
(0.12) (0.38)
Financial dependence*Lerner index of banks each firm does 
business with
-2.714 ***
(1.04)
R2 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.019 0.018 0.019
Number of observations 9,938 9,938 9,938 9,938 9,938 9,938 9,938
Differential in real growth rate 
Financial development 0.670 *** 0.692 *** 0.632 *** 0.803 *** 0.803 *** 0.666 *** 0.696 ***
Bank competition - 0.046 -1.580 -0.528 * 1.907 -0.079 0.367 **
 
Note: See table 4 
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Table 6. Financial development, bank competition and growth rate of sales. Large firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Constant 0.076 0.255 -0.933 -0.073 1.889 0.010 0.060
(0.17) (0.53) (1.07) (0.72) (2.49) (0.18) (0.20)
Financial dependence*Financial development -0.104 -0.194 -0.114 -0.124 -0.118 -0.099 -0.103
(0.33) (0.42) (0.42) (0.35) (0.35) (0.33) (0.33)
Financial dependence*HHI -1.641 19.076
(4.53) (16.83)
Financial dependence*HHI2 -93.229
(72.95)
Financial dependence*Lerner index of the market 0.785 -14.069
(3.70) (18.42)
Financial dependence*Lerner index of the market2 25.826
(31.38)
Financial dependence*Lerner index of banks each firm does 
business with
0.297 -0.266
(0.26) (0.97)
Financial dependence*Lerner index of banks each firm does 
business with
1.503
(2.51)
R2 -0.023 -0.024 -0.023 -0.024 -0.024 -0.023 -0.023
Number of observations 1,204 1,204 1,204 1,204 1,204 1,204 1,204  
Note: see table 4. 
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Figure 1. Financial development in the Spanish provinces. Average 1997-2003 
(Private credit/GDP). Percentages 
44% - 60%
61% - 68%
69% - 77%
78% - 122%
 
Source: Bank of Spain, INE and own elaboration. 
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Figure 2. Lerner indices by provinces. Average 1997-2003. 
0.28- 0.30
0.30 - 0.32
0.32 - 0.34
0.34 - 0.38
 
Source: AEB, CECA, UNACC and own elaboration 
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Figure 3. Herfindahl-Hirschman index of banking concentration in the Spanish 
provinces. Average 1997-2003 
  
Source: AEB, CECA, UNACC and own elaboration 
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Figure 4. The U-shaped  relationship between market power and economic growth 
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Source: own elaboration. 
